Lee Walters
Southampton
"The Existence and Identity of Linguistic Artefacts"
I consider the question of whether we can formulate an informative criterion of identity for linguistic artefacts, such as fictions. I reject Nelson Goodman’s one-level criterion of identity for such artefacts for familiar contextualist/externalist reasons that have been emphasised by Jerrold Levinson. But I argue that Levinson’s own one-level criterion is also inadequate. A more promising approach is Amie Thomasson’s two-level criterion of identity for fictions. I show, however, that Thomasson’s account rests on a controversial assumptions about instances of fictions that many reject. Moreover, even if we grant Thomasson’s assumption, her account suffers from a number of independent problems. I argue that the lesson that is suggested from the failure of Thomasson’s account is that there is no non-circular criterion of identity for fictions, but that this should not worry the externalist about such artefacts.
Southampton
"The Existence and Identity of Linguistic Artefacts"
I consider the question of whether we can formulate an informative criterion of identity for linguistic artefacts, such as fictions. I reject Nelson Goodman’s one-level criterion of identity for such artefacts for familiar contextualist/externalist reasons that have been emphasised by Jerrold Levinson. But I argue that Levinson’s own one-level criterion is also inadequate. A more promising approach is Amie Thomasson’s two-level criterion of identity for fictions. I show, however, that Thomasson’s account rests on a controversial assumptions about instances of fictions that many reject. Moreover, even if we grant Thomasson’s assumption, her account suffers from a number of independent problems. I argue that the lesson that is suggested from the failure of Thomasson’s account is that there is no non-circular criterion of identity for fictions, but that this should not worry the externalist about such artefacts.